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Abstract 
 
The article raises the issue about the nature of the 
relationship between the supreme power and 
society of the early Russian state. The article 
proceeded from the well-known phrase of the 
imperial diplomat S. Herberstein, who wrote 
about the “slave essence” of Russians in the 
middle of the XVIth century. The authors of the 
article argue that this erroneous opinion was 
based on incorrect and wrongly interpreted 
official relations, which constituted one of the 
cornerstones of the Moscow political system and 
which was quite clear. Meanwhile, according to 
the authors, there was also a different, “internal” 
level of interrelations, based on unwritten 
“contract” between the supreme power and 
society, involving mutual obligations between the 
“contract” parties. The authors of the article show 
that this unwritten contract, which was well 
understood by both parties, who participated in it, 
functioned well in Russia during the 16th — 17th 
centuries, and its existence refutes convincingly 
the Herberstein's passage, who failed to 
understand the Russian political realities of the 
early Modern Age.  
  
Keywords: Early New Time, political regime, 
“composite” state, Russian state, autocracy, Ivan 
the Terrible 
 
 
  Resumen  
 
El artículo plantea el problema sobre la 
naturaleza de la relación entre el poder supremo 
y la sociedad del estado ruso primitivo. El 
artículo procede de la conocida frase del 
diplomático imperial S. Herberstein, quien 
escribió sobre la "esencia de esclavo" de los 
rusos a mediados del siglo XVI. Los autores del 
artículo argumentan que esta opinión errónea se 
basaba en relaciones oficiales incorrectas e 
interpretadas erróneamente, que constituían una 
de las piedras angulares del sistema político de 
Moscú y que era bastante clara. Mientras tanto, 
según los autores, también hubo un nivel 
diferente, "interno" de interrelaciones, basado en 
el "contrato" no escrito entre el poder supremo y 
la sociedad, que involucra obligaciones mutuas 
entre las partes del "contrato". Los autores del 
artículo muestran que este contrato no escrito, 
que fue bien comprendido por ambas partes, que 
participaron en él, funcionó bien en Rusia 
durante los siglos XVI a XVII, y su existencia 
refuta convincentemente el pasaje de 
Herberstein, que no entendió el ruso. Realidades 
políticas de la temprana Edad Moderna. 
 
Palabras claves: Early New Time, régimen 
político, estado "compuesto", estado ruso, 
autocracia, Ivan el Terrible. 
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Resumo
 
O artigo levanta a questão sobre a natureza da relação entre o poder supremo e a sociedade do estado russo 
primitivo. O artigo procede da conhecida frase do diplomata imperial S. Herberstein, que escreveu sobre a 
“essência escrava” dos russos em meados do século XVI. Os autores do artigo argumentam que essa opinião 
errônea foi baseada em relações oficiais incorretas e mal interpretadas, o que constituiu uma das pedras 
angulares do sistema político de Moscou e que ficou bastante claro. Enquanto isso, segundo os autores, 
havia também um nível de inter-relações “interno” diferente, baseado em “contrato” não escrito entre o 
poder supremo e a sociedade, envolvendo obrigações mútuas entre as partes “contratuais”. Os autores do 
artigo mostram que este contrato não escrito, que foi bem compreendido pelos dois partidos, que nele 
participaram, funcionou bem na Rússia durante os séculos XVI e XVII, e sua existência refuta 
convincentemente a passagem de Herberstein, que não conseguiu entender o russo. realidades políticas do 
início da Idade Moderna. 
 
Palavras-chave: Early New Time, regime político, estado "composto", estado russo, autocracia, Ivan, o 
Terrível. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The imperial diplomat and memoirist S. 
Herberstein in his “Notes upon Russia”, 
describing the customs of the Muscovites, noted 
as something extraordinary that “all confess 
themselves to be Chlopos, that is, serfs of the 
prince” and that “this people enjoy slavery more 
than freedom” (Major, 2017). This statement, 
uncritically perceived by the later European 
voyager-creators of Rossica, and through them - 
by the historians of New and Newest times, was 
firmly established in the historiographic tradition 
and especially in public opinion of Europe and 
Russia. Although the appeal not to narrative 
monuments, but to assembly materials and to 
Russian legislation, the main body of which 
became available after the considerable 
publication of archival materials in the 19th 
century, should have led historians to the idea 
that the notorious “Russian slavery” is a curious 
phenomenon far enough separated from 
"slavery" in the usual sense (Poe, 2002). 
 
However, this did not happen, and the forms of 
serfdom, characteristic of the 2nd half of the 
XVIIIth - the 1st half of the XIXth century, were 
automatically transferred to earlier times, 
including the early New Age with the 
simultaneous development of the corresponding 
political, legal and socio-cultural models. The 
dynamics of dependence relation development, 
the changes of the legal and social status among 
the lower categories of population, although 
monitored, but was interpreted within the 
framework of the “slave discourse” set by 
Herberstein and his followers. 
 
The main problem here was that the notorious 
“discourse” set a very rigid framework within 
which the researcher could and should act, 
prevented the expansion of historical search field 
and the formation of a more adequate view 
concerning the political, legal and social 
structure of Russian state and society of the early 
New time. “There is no history without a 
historian,” and if a historian “establishes” it, 
interpreting the source (especially if this source 
is narrative, deeply subjective by definition) at a 
certain angle and arranging the accents 
accordingly in the framework of the dominant 
“discourse” (in our case - "slavish" one), then the 
result was the picture that could be very different 
sometimes from the past reality. What happens if 
you try to look at the sources from a different 
angle, perform their analysis, with a different 
“questionnaire” in hand, and thus “re-establish” 
the history, answering the following question: 
were the Muscovites of the early New Age the 
“people” born for slavery? Is it possible? In our 
opinion, it is possible! 
 
Methods 
 
Starting our small research, we decided to 
analyze a very important aspect of its 
development, significant for understanding the 
essence of the political and legal processes that 
took place in the early modern Russian state and 
society, namely the evolution of the relationship 
between the supreme power and society elite, 
"best people", "political nation", capable of 
putting pressure on the government and forcing 
it to listen to their opinion. 
 
Starting the research, we proceeded from a 
number of fundamental ideas expressed by a 
number of researchers in recent decades. First of 
all, we proceeded from the fact that, according to 
M. Mann, the supreme power of early-modern 
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Russia, as well as of other modern states existed 
in two hypostasis - “despotic” and 
“infrastructural”. The researcher wrote the 
following: «The first sense concerns what we 
might term the despotic power of the state elite, 
the range of actions which the elite is empowered 
to undertake without routine, institutionalized the 
negotiation with civil society groups». However, 
he continued, there is also “a second sense”, 
“infrastructural power,” and this infrastructural 
power was weak during the period under review 
(Mann, 1984). Having modernized the provisions 
expressed by M. Mann, we will further proceed 
from the fact that by “despotic power” we mean 
the declared power, in the spirit of the well-
known saying “L'etat c'est moi” and its Russian 
analogue “I am free with my servants - I execute 
or please them if I want". We will regard 
“Infrastructure power,” as a real power exercised 
in practice, not in words and not in declarations. 
 
The concept of “sinews of power” (J. Brewer), 
which can also be translated as “the musculature 
of power” and as “the infrastructure of power” is 
directly connected with infrastructure power 
(Brewer, 2002). This infrastructure consisted of 
the structure, the support frame around which the 
entire state machine was built, as well as its drive 
belts, through which its individual elements 
rotated and its functioning as a whole was 
ensured. According to N. Kollmann, these 
“sinews of power” represented not only «new 
taxes and bureaucratic institutions to administer 
territory, collect revenues and mobilize human 
and material resources», but also a kind of 
“superstructure” in the form of the appropriate 
legislative and legitimizing reinforcements 
represented by the “new codifications of the law 
and new centralized judicial systems”, 
confessional politics and closely related to the 
latest and based on its appropriate political 
ideology (which acquired religious coloring 
during the period under review) (Kollmann, 
2012). 
 
The creation of this power infrastructure and 
building up the appropriate “musculature”, 
which was to guarantee the fulfillment of those 
potencies that were declared in “despotic power” 
over time, as the experience of studying the 
features of state and legal construction during the 
early New Age shows, is a complex, ambiguous 
and non-linear process. The late medieval 
societies that embarked on this path were, in one 
way or another, agrarian, conservative, “cold” 
societies, focused on the reproduction of the 
usual forms of life: political, administrative, 
legal, social, cultural and other. These "cold" 
societies were suspicious of any kind of 
innovations that could only be incorporated into 
the existing order of things, if they appealed to 
the good old tradition, to the "old days". The 
latter was the highest authority and the last 
instance, which gave the desired absolute 
legitimacy of innovation in any field. Hence, a 
distinct evolutionary “trend” in the development 
of that very “infrastructure of power”, the 
gradual development of “muscles” by power, the 
veiling of innovations behind a kind of “veil” in 
the form of “antiquities” reproduction (however, 
this gradualness and evolutionary nature 
excluded abrupt, intermittent development 
associated with large-scale political and social 
upheavals by no means). 
 
The supreme power, acting within this system, 
was bound entirely by the necessity of this 
“antiquity” observation (external, in words). This 
constraint, connectedness was conditioned by its 
internal weakness, its lack of due, capable of 
forcing the society (by which we mean primarily 
the "political nation") to obey, the administrative 
resource, the developed infrastructure of power. 
Here is the time to recall the concept of the 
“composite state”, which was introduced into 
scientific circulation by G. Koenigsberger and 
improved by J. Elliott (Elliott, 1992; 
Koenigsberger, 1978). For our small research, 
the most interesting idea is the idea expressed in 
the framework of this concept by J. Elliott. He 
noted that "sixteenth-century Europe is one of the 
states of civil union, co-existing with its 
territorial status and jurisdictional units jealously 
guarding their independent status." The supreme 
power in the early-modem states, seeking to stop 
local discontent caused by the change in political 
and administrative status, and to guarantee the 
loyalty of local elites and the population, 
«promise to observe traditional laws, customs 
and practices could mitigate the pains of these 
dynastic transactions, and help reconcile elites to 
the change of masters». At the same time, 
seeking to maintain supreme control over the 
development of events on the ground, it 
“superstructured” its own traditional political, 
administrative and legal institutions, acting as the 
supreme arbiter (Elliott, 1992). 
This kind of strategy, based on the preservation 
of the old times (in any case, at first), allowed the 
supreme power to rely reasonably on the loyalty 
of local elites and the fulfillment of their 
obligations to their new sovereign. In exchange, 
the latter guaranteed the elites and local 
communities to preserve their privileged (in the 
first case) and/or customary (in the second case) 
status. The foundation of this political and legal 
system, as was noted by J. Brewer and E. 
Hellmuth, was negotiations, not violence 
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(however, these negotiations did not exclude the 
use of violence) (Ogilvie et al, 1999). 
 
However, such a balance assumed both a 
significant share of society participation, and 
above all, a “political nation” (central and local) 
in government, and certain mechanisms for the 
coordination of the supreme power and local elite 
interests. And it’s hard not to agree with V. 
Kivelson’s opinion when she pointed to the fact 
that in early-modern Russia, just as in other 
modern states, the supreme power needed 
support from various groups of population, while 
the latter relied on "reciprocity" by the monarch 
and on the protection of their social and legal 
status by him (Kivelson, 1996). And in the XVIth 
century, when the young Russian state was still 
developing, this support was needed to a greater 
extent from society than in the XVIIth century, 
because the efficiency and the effectiveness of 
state administration largely depended on it. 
Describing this aspect of the early-stage states, 
N. Kollmann noted the following: «in all these 
states, legitimacy was grounded not only in the 
measured deployment of state-sanctioned 
violence, but also in the state’s fulfillment, to a 
greater or lesser degree, of expectations that the 
ruler would respond to his people, respect 
tradition and provide security» (Kollmann, 2012; 
Alekseev, 1991). Denying the supreme power of 
legitimacy, the society thereby put 
insurmountable obstacles in the way of the 
“sovereign's cause”. 
 
Discussion and Results 
 
So, it can be argued that early-moderated Russia 
is characterized by interaction, or, moreover, by 
partnership (to a certain extent), the supreme 
power and society of which was the cornerstone 
of the entire political and administrative system. 
And this relation worked in both directions. 
Society could rely on power, but power, in its 
turn, relied on the loyalty of society and its 
support when it needed this. N. Kollmann 
analyzed the experience of urban uprisings in 
Moscow during 1648 and 1662 in one of her last 
works, as well as the marksman rebellion of 
1682, showing this connection between the king 
and his people (Kollmann, 2012), however this 
relation worked a century earlier, and, we 
emphasize it once again, in both directions. And 
in the middle of the XVIth century, as well as a 
century later, the people considered it right to 
apply directly to the tsar with a request to punish 
those whom he considered guilty of the great 
Moscow fires of spring and especially in June 
1547 (and the script of the Moscow revolt of 
1547 almost fits the descriptions of the revolt of 
1648 except of some details, known as the “Salt 
Riot” and fits perfectly into the scheme of the 
people’s appeal to the supreme power, described 
by V. Kivelson as “advice, petition, discontent, 
rebellion", and the actions of rebels suggest that 
they acted within the traditional judicial 
procedures of criminal investigation legalized 
from the "top" and their subsequent public 
punishment) (Chronicle collection, referred to as 
the Patriarch or Nikon chronicle, 2000). 
 
One more detail is noteworthy in the revolt of 
June 1547 - the noble family Glinsky, the closest 
royal relatives, suffered from the hands of the 
insurgent Moscow townspeople, and in the later 
chronicle, edited by the king himself, it was 
agreed that Glinskys and their people, using their 
proximity to the sovereign, broke bad and 
committed many crimes and clearly abused the 
trust of the young sovereign. The editor of the 
"Royal Book" (Ivan IV himself?) did not spare 
the memory of the royal uncle killed by 
Muscovites. And another moment that also 
deserves mentioning - as during the next century 
in a similar case, the direct instigators of the riot 
and the riots that swept through Moscow were 
punished, while the majority of the rebels were 
not. De facto, the government thereby recognized 
the right of an uprising to the people if its voice, 
the people’s voice, was not heard by the supreme 
authority. 
 
Of course, we are far from trying to idealize this 
system, but still let's note that although there are 
separate actors in this historical drama (it does 
not matter whether they are individuals or 
groups) pursued their own particular interests, 
nevertheless, this system acted and imposed 
certain restrictions on the supreme power 
competence. And, perhaps, the discrepancy 
between the very “despotic”, declarative power 
and real power, “infrastructural” one was very 
clear during that time. Of course, Ivan the 
Terrible, and his weaker successors, could 
declare their claims to absolute power in the 
spirit of the unforgettable Louis XIV, but in 
reality this absolute power was asserted as the 
result of a kind of consensus, the result of a long 
process of interest coordination among various 
political actors, groups and forces. 
 
Of course, the first, leading roles were played by 
the elite in this play — the boyars, the supreme 
stratum of Moscow and partly the provincial one, 
nobility, the “princes” of the church (the 
episcopate and the superior of the largest 
monasteries), as well as the city elite (to a lesser 
extent than previous social groups). However, 
the "black people", the common people, did not 
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stand aside. Their opinion was also meant 
something and was taken into account in the 
political scenario and the most important 
decisions, as well as by the supreme authority, 
and by other actors of this “performance”. And 
the supreme power used it in its own interests, 
when appealed to the “opinion of the people, 
making certain decisions that could seriously 
change the situation in the country and the 
balance of power” (A.S. Pushkin), in which it 
saw that supreme force capable of giving final 
sanction, the necessary legitimacy and the 
legitimacy to the actions taken by the monarch. 
In the history of Ivan the Terrible reign one can 
count at least three such appeals to this very 
“popular opinion” as the most important source 
of legitimacy. In this case, we are talking about 
the events of the beginning of 1565, related to the 
establishment of the notorious “oprichnina”, the 
convocation of the “Zemsky Sobor” of 1566 on 
the issue of the continuation of the next Russian-
Lithuanian war and the Moscow executions in 
July 1570 within the case about Novgorod 
"treason". 
 
In the first case, Ivan IV, having confronted with 
the growing opposition to his actions among the 
ruling elite, "laid his anger" on the "princes of the 
church", the boyars, the officials and nobility, 
accusing them of engaging in all sorts of abuse 
and oppressing the common people, that they 
were not engaged in state service, but were 
thinking more and more about their profits, and 
the clergy also covered thieves and traitors, using 
their old right to “grieve” (Krom, 2010). 
Obviously, the disgrace announced by Ivan in 
January 1565 was related to the fact that the tacit 
agreement concluded at the “conciliation 
council” in February 1549 between the king and 
his entourage regarding the forgetting of all 
previous mutual claims and discontent was 
repeatedly violated by the representatives of the 
ruling elite (De Madariaga, 2005). However, in 
order to punish the violators of this unofficial 
"contract" Ivan the Terrible just lacked that very 
"infrastructural" power (despite the fact that the 
king publicly expressed his opinion about his 
"despotic" power and its limits repeatedly 
(Skriennikov, 1992). The king did not yet have 
the necessary administrative resources to 
suppress opposition resistance, acting within the 
framework of the traditional system of relations 
and the ruling elite. And then the king, trying to 
deal with those whom he considered traitors, 
resorted to the last measure - he appealed to the 
"population opinion", to the ordinary Muscovite-
townspeople. 
 
This appeal was a complete success - the 
Moscow people of all ranks “beat their heads” to 
Metropolitan Athanasius, so that he, along with 
the whole church council, petitioned the 
sovereign for holding the throne. Otherwise, the 
citizens threatened that they will deal with those 
whom the sovereign accused of treason by 
themselves, so as not to experience those abuses 
and fraud again on the part of those in power, as 
was the case during Ivan’s early childhood. The 
specter of a popular uprising, similar to the June 
1547 revolt, led to the success of the plan 
conceived by Ivan the Terrible - the ruling elite 
agreed with his plan to establish the oprichnina 
and the persecute those whom the sovereign 
suspected of treason. And although in a certain 
sense it was the violation of the old political 
tradition, the sanction given by the “people's 
opinion” made this change quite legitimate, 
empowering the king with the powers he did not 
have if he tried to resolve the conflict, acting in 
the framework of "old times". 
 
The following year (1566), Ivan the Terrible 
turned to the “people's opinion” again when he 
and his advisers were asked whether to continue 
the war with Lithuania or to conclude a truce with 
it under conditions that were clearly unprofitable 
for Moscow, which had the initiative during the 
war. The issue is if Ivan the Terrible possessed 
that same “despotic power” about which he 
wrote, for example, in his epistles to Prince A.M. 
Kurbsky, then, why would he convene the 
notorious “Zemsky Sobor” and bring up for 
discussion the assembled representatives of the 
main “ranks” of the Russian state, church, service 
and trade? This issue seemed to be in the sphere 
of state affair as if it was in the exclusive 
competence of the king and his proxies. The final 
act of the cathedral, the conciliar charter, said that 
all three “orders” were in favor of the war and did 
not want reconciliation with Lithuania on its 
terms, which deprived the Russian state of a 
significant part of the results achieved during the 
successful winter of 1562/63 (Polotsk 
campaign). Now, after the support from the three 
"ranks", Ivan was free to resume the war. 
 
The third, most difficult case is the July 
executions of 1570 in Moscow. Unfortunately, 
our information about the events that took place 
in Moscow in those days is based on very 
subjective narrative sources, demanding a very 
critical attitude to them for this reason. Omitting 
the details about the events preceding the 
execution of July 25, 1570, and very picturesque, 
but, in our opinion, unreliable details in the 
description of the execution itself, in our opinion, 
it is worth paying attention to one moment in this 
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whole story - Ivan the Terrible addressed the 
audience on the square to Moscow townspeople 
with the question of whether he is doing the right 
thing, executing the “traitors” who were exposed 
"The voice of the people" said that yes, that's 
right, the sovereign has the right to execute his 
"traitors" and he did the right thing. You can, of 
course, view this story as a kind of comedy and 
consider the approval from the people 
concerning the execution as “complete fiction”, 
as R.G. Skrynnikov did this, for instance [See: 
14. 402], who is regarded as one of the leading 
experts on the history of the era of Ivan the 
Terrible. However, in our opinion, this opinion is 
clearly biased and, in a certain sense, 
“modernizes” the situation, since it does not take 
into account, on the one hand, the mentality of 
that era, and on the other, the psychological 
characteristics of Ivan the Terrible himself, a 
person who was extremely responsible to his 
duties as an Orthodox sovereign, and thus he 
could hardly play a comedy in such a serious 
matter. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the 
same foreigners, for example, G. Staden, 
reported that Moscow clerks were unclean and 
bribe-takers. In a word, this event can easily be 
interpreted differently than is customary if we go 
beyond the framework of the traditional "tyrany 
fighting" discourse. 
 
Perhaps these examples alone clearly 
demonstrate how far the political reality of the 
Russian state of the XVI-XVII centuries is from 
the expressed Herberstein idea. But you can 
continue this series, taking, for example, the 
history of the great Russian Troubles at the 
beginning of the 17th century, in which the 
interweaving of service and contractual relations 
that united Moscow society, the king and his 
people, played an extremely important and 
decisive role in the reign by the dynasty 
Godunovs, impostors, the exile of Polish prince 
Vladislav and the assertion of the Romanovs 
dynasty.    
 
Conclusions  
 
Let's summarize the preliminary results. N.N. 
Pokrovsky, describing the particularities of the 
emerging political system of the young Russian 
state during the early Modern Times, noted that 
“this power (of the Grand Duke - Auth.) was not 
so strong, that local characteristics and 
differences were experienced in a single state for 
a very long time ... The power system was based 
not on the only concept of “state”, but on two 
concepts - “state” and “society”, on a well-
thought-out system of not only direct, but also 
reverse connections between them ... The central 
government of that time could not reach every 
individual; fulfilling its functions, it had to rely 
on these primary social communities (peasant 
and urban "worlds", service corporations-
"cities", etc. - Auth.). But this meant the serious 
rights of such organisms, their considerable role 
in the political system of the whole country 
(highlighted by us - Auth.) ...” (Alekseev, 2001; 
Eisvandi et al, 2015). 
 
This political system, which was based on a tacit 
agreement between the government and society 
(let us recall once more about the thesis by J. 
Brewer and E. Hellmuth, which we have 
mentioned above) included the subsystem on 
service relationships at the same time. These 
service relations permeated the entire Moscow 
society from top to bottom and horizontally. 
“The duty of public service, i.e. the service to the 
Fatherland, embodied in the sovereign of all 
Russia, flowed from the whole being of the 
Russian state and was determined, on the one 
hand, by the objective need to have a strong, 
capable state, capable of defending Russia 
independence and integrity, on the other hand - 
by paternalism as the main form of relations 
between the head of the state and his people”, - 
this is how Yu.G. Alekseev described the essence 
of this “zemsky-servile state” (Alekseev, 2001). 
 
The complex interplay of contractual and service 
relations based on paternalism constituted the 
political fabric of the Russian early-modern state. 
But, since this fabric was not articulated 
anywhere (we mean, of course, first of all a kind 
of "charter" or some other kind of document that 
clearly states the rights and obligations of the 
parties - the authorities and the society, the king 
and the four "official strata“ of the Russian 
society - priests, military people, traders and 
peasants), then it remained an absolute Terra 
incognita for foreign observers. The contractual 
essence of the Moscow political system, the 
mutual obligations between the supreme power, 
personified in the image of the Orthodox 
sovereign, and his people, eluded them, and it is 
clear why. After all, they were “strangers”, 
“others”, and the Muscovites did not intend to 
share (or did not consider it was necessary to say 
that was obvious for them anyway) with them the 
secrets of their “inner life”. The European 
official observers interpreted the state relations in 
Russia by the traditional way of “freedom” - 
“non-freedom”, reinterpreted in the Renaissance 
era, deriving the theories about the certain 
“slave” essence of the Moscow monarch subjects 
(Davoodabadi & Shahsavari, 2014; Kanashiro et 
al, 2014; Lee et al., 2018). 
 
         Vol. 8 Núm. 19 /Marzo - abril 2019 
 
 
Encuentre este artículo en http://www.udla.edu.co/revistas/index.php/amazonia- investiga               ISSN 2322- 6307  
571 
Alas, the difference in mentality played a cruel 
joke, contributing to the formation of a stable 
negative stereotype and erecting a powerful 
obstacle to the deep essence of Russian statehood 
understanding during the era of the early Modern 
Age. If we discard the notorious “slave” 
“discourse” aside and try to analyze the 
information sources (not only and not so much 
narrative) from a comparative historical 
perspective, it is not difficult to draw parallels 
and analogies between the political structure of 
the early-modern states of Western Europe and 
Russia. And, naturally, under these conditions, 
there can be no certain predisposition of the 
Moscow sovereign subjects for slavery.   
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